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Abstract. Directed signature is the solution of such problems when the signed message 
contains information sensitive to the signature receiver. Generally, in many application of 
directed signature, the signer is generally a single person. But when the message is on 
behalf of an organization, a valid sensitive message may require the approval of several 
people. Threshold signature schemes are used to solve these problems. This paper 
presents a threshold directed signature scheme.  
1. Introduction 
Physical signature is a natural tool to authenticate the communication ,but it is useless in 
electronic messages; one has to rely on other methods like digital signature. Digital signature is a 
cryptographic tool to solve this problems of authenticity in electronic communications.  Basically 
digital signature has a property that anyone having a copy of the signature can check its validity by 
using some  public-information, but no one else can forge the signature on another document. This 
self-authentication  property  of digital signatures is quite suitable for many uses such as 
broadcasting of announcements and public key  certificates, but it unsuitable for many applications. 
In many situations, signed message is sensitive to the signature receiver. Signatures on medical 
records, tax information and most personal/business transactions are such situations. For these 
situations the signature on the message should be such as only the signature receiver can verify the 
signature and can prove  the validity of the signature to any third party , whenever necessary.. Such 
signatures are called directed signatures [3,4,13,14].In directed signature scheme, the signature 
receiver B has full control over the signature verification process. Nobody can check the validity of 
signature without his cooperation.  
In most situations, the signer is generally a single person. However when the message is on behalf 
of an organization, a valid  message may require the approval  or consent of several people. In this 
case, the signature is done by more than one consenting rather than by a single person. A common 
example of this policy is a large bank transaction, which requires the signature of more than one 
person. Such a policy could be implemented by having a separate digital signature for every required 
signer, but this solution increases the effort to verify the message linearly with the number of signer. 
Threshold signature is an answer to this problem. 
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The (t, n) threshold signature schemes [6,7,8,10,12] are used to solve these problems.   Threshold 
signatures are closely related to the concept of threshold cryptography, first introduced by Desmedt 
[7,8]. In 1991 Desmedt and Frankel [6] proposed the first (t, n) threshold digital signature scheme 
based on the RSA assumption. This paper proposed a (t , n) threshold directed signature scheme 
based on Shamir’s  threshold signature scheme[21] and Schnorr’s signature scheme[20]. 
The section-2 presents some basic tools. In Section-3 we present a Threshold Directed 
Signature Scheme.  Section-4 discusses the security of the Scheme. An illustration to the scheme   
is discussed in section-5.  Remarks are in section-6.  
2. Preliminaries     
2.1. Throughout this paper we will use the following system setting.  
• A prime modulous p, where 2 511 <  p  < 2 512 . 
• A prime modulous q, where 2 159 <  q  < 2 160 and q is a divisor of p – 1. 
• A number g, where   g      k (p –1) /q mod p, k is random integer with 1  k  p –1 such that 
g >1; (g is a generator of order q in Zp*
 
). 
• A collision free one-way hash function h [23]. 
The parameters p, q, g and h are common to all users. We assume that every user A  chooses a 
random Ax ∈ Zq  and computes  Ay  = Αxg   mod p .Here Ax  is the  private key of  A and Ay  is the  
public key of A. For our purpose ,we use the directed signature scheme based on Schnorr’s signature 
scheme [20] and Shamir’s threshold scheme [21]. These basic tools are briefly described below. 
2.2.Schnorr’s signature scheme 
In this scheme, the signature of A on message m are given by ( Ar , AS ), where,   
Ar  =  h (g Ak  mod p, m), and     AS   =   Ak  − Ax . Ar  mod p. 
     Here  random Ak ∈ Zq   is private to A . The signature are verified by checking the equality    
             Ar    =    h  ( g AS    y Ar  mod p , m ) . 
2.3.Shamir’s threshold scheme 
Shamir’s (t, n) threshold secret sharing signature scheme is a scheme to distribute a  secret key K 
into n users in such a way that any t users can cooperate to reconstruct K but a collusion of t – 1 or 
less users reveal nothing about the secret.  Shamir’s scheme is based on Lagrange interpolation in a 
field. To implement it, a polynomial f of degree t – 1 is randomly chosen in Zq such that f (0) = K. 
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Each user i is given a public identity iu and a  secret share f ( iu ). Now any t out of n shareholders can 
reconstruct the secret K =  f (0), by pooling their shares and using 
                       f (0)           =      q
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  Here we assume for simplicity that the authorized subset  of  t  users consists of shareholders i 
for i =1,2,3…t. 
2.4. Directed signature scheme 
 Suppose that user A wants to generate a signature on message m so that only the receiver B can 
verify the signature and that B can prove the validity of signature to any third party C, whenever 
necessary. This scheme consists of  the following steps. 
2.4.1. Signature generation by A to B 
(a).  A picks at random 
1a
K and 
2a
K  ∈  Zq and computes   
WB   =   g  1aK 2aK−    mod p  and  ZB   =    By 1a
K
 mod p. 
(b). Using a one-way hash function h, A computes Ar   =   h (ZB  , WB ,  m), and then 
                                                                                  AS    =   2aK − Ax . Ar  mod q. 
 The arrangement of numbers  { AS  , WB , Ar , m} is the signature if A on m. 
2.4.2.Signature verification by B 
(a). B computes  µ   =   [g AS  ( Ay ) Ar WB] mod p  and    ZB     =   µ  Bx  mod p. 
(b) B computes  h (ZB  , WB ,  m)  and checks the validity of signature by equality       
                                   Ar  =  h (ZB  , WB ,  m)mod q. 
2.4.3.Proof of validity by B to any third party C 
(a) B  sends   to { AS  , WB , Ar , m, µ} to C. 
(b) C checks  if   Ar   =   h (ZB  , WB ,  m)mod q. 
                If this does not hold C stops the process; otherwise goes to the  next steps. 
(c)  B in a zero knowledge fashion  proves to C that  logµ ZB =   log g By  as follows. 
• C chooses  random u, v ∈ Zp computes  w  =  µ u . g v mod p and sends w to B. 
• B chooses  random  ∈ Zp computes   =  w. g α mod p and  γ   =   Bx  mod p, and 
sends , γ   to C. 
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• C sends u, v to B, by which B can verify that   w  =  µ u . g v mod p. 
• B sends  to C, by which she can verify that            
  =  µ u . g v +α mod p  and   γ  = ZB u yB v +α  mod p. 
3. Proposed Scheme 
In this section, we present a threshold directed signature scheme. Let G be a group of n 
designated users, out of which any t members can generate the signature on a message m for a user B. 
The user B can verify the signature and that B can prove its validity to any third party C, whenever 
necessary. Nobody can check the validity of the signature without the help of B. We describe a 
construction of threshold directed signature scheme for this situation as follows. 
We assume the existence of a trusted share distribution center (SDC) which determines the group 
secrets parameters and the secret shares vi ,i ∈ G. Let H be any subset of G, containing t members. We 
also assume the existence of a designated combiner DC  who collects partial signatures from each 
user in the subgroup H. Every shareholder in the group has equal authority with regard to the group 
secret. The  generation of  the directed signature requires t out of n shareholders and interaction with 
DC. This scheme consists of the following steps. 
3.1.1.Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation 
(a). SDC selects the group public parameters p, q, g and a collision free one way hash 
function h as described in section 2.1 . SDC also selects a polynomial      
           f (x) = a0 + a1x +….a t-1 xt-1 mod q , with  a0     =     K   =   f (0). 
(b). SDC computes the group public key, Gy , as,  Gy  =     g f (0) mod p. 
(c) SDC computes a secret shares  vi  for each member of the group G, as, 
                                            vi  = f (ui ) mod q. 
         Here ui  is the public value associated with user i  in the group. 
(d) SDC sends vi to each user in a secret manner. 
3.1.2.Signature generation by any t users 
If any t out of n members of the group agree to sign a message m for user B, they generate the 
signature using following steps. 
(a) Each member  i  randomly selects 
1i
K and 
2i
K  ∈  Zq and computes   
               wi  =   g 2iK 1iK− mod p  and   zi   = By 2i
K
 mod p. 
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(b)  Each member  makes   wi   openly and  zi  secretly available to each member of H . 
Once all wi and  zi are available, every member computes  Z,W and  R as 
W  = qw
Hi
i mod∏
∈
, Z  = qz
Hi
i mod∏
∈
,and R  =  h ( Z,  W , m) mod q. 
(c) Each member i  modifies his/her share, as MSi =  vi  . q
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(d)  Each member i uses his/her modified share, MSi  and random integer 1iK to calculate the 
partial signature si as,  si  = 1iK   
_
     MSi .R mod q. 
(e) Each member i sends his/her partial signature to the designated combiner DC who 
collects the partial signatures and  produces  S ,as,  S   =  
=
t
i ,1
si mod q. 
(f )  DC sends { S,W,R ,m} to B as signature of the group G for the message m. 
3.1.3. Signature verification by B 
(a). B computes  µ  =  [  g S ( Gy ) R    W ]  mod p  and  Z    =  µ Bx  mod p. 
(b) B checks the validity of signature by verifying  R =  h (Z ,W ,m) mod q. 
3.1.4. Proof of validity by B to any third party C 
  This part of the protocol runs as in section- 2.4.3 and we omit it here. 
4. Security discussions 
we now  discuss security aspect of the proposed scheme.  
(a). Is it possible to retrieve the group secret key f (0) from the group public key Gy ? No 
because this is as difficult as solving discrete logarithm problem. 
(b). Can one retrieve the secret shares vi , ,i ∈ G,  from the public value  ui  ? No because f  is a 
randomly and secretly selected polynomial. 
(c). Can one retrieve the secret shares vi ,integer 1iK  and partial signature si , from the 
equation   si  =  1iK - MSi .R mod q.  ?Here the number of unknown parameters is  three. 
The number of equation is one, so it is computationally infeasible for a forger to collect 
the secret shares vi ,integer 1iK  and partial signature si  ,i ∈ G.   
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(d). Can the designated combiner DC retrieve the group secret key f (0) or any partial 
information from the following equation, S =  
=
t
i ,1
si mod q? This is again 
computationally infeasible. 
(e). Can one impersonate a member i ,i ∈ H.? A forger may try to impersonate a 
shareholder i ,  by randomly selecting  two integers 
1i
K and 
2i
K  ∈  Zq and 
broadcasting  wi and  zi. But without knowing the secret share vi,  it is difficult to 
generate a valid  partial signature si to satisfy the verification equation, 
         Z  =   [  g S ( Gy ) R    W ] Bx   mod p, where ,  S = 
=
t
i ,1
si mod q. 
(f). Can one forge a signature { S,W,R ,m} by the following equation, 
                                            µ  =  [  g S ( Gy ) R    W ]  mod p.? 
To compute integer S from here is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem. If 
any forger randomly selects *S  and sends { *S ,W,Z,R ,m} to B, the receiver B would 
computes µ*   =  [  g
*S ( Gy ) R    W ]  mod p and Z*  =     µ* Bx  mod p and checks if  
                     
 Br  =
?
 
 
h (Z*  ,WB,  m).       
    The receiver B can easily identify that someone has forged the signature. 
(g). Can t or more shareholders act in collusion to reconstruct the polynomial f (x) .? 
            According to the following equation, 
                                   f (x)           =      q
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 the secret polynomial f (x) can be reconstructed  with the knowledge of any t secret 
shares f ( ui ), ,i ∈ G.   
So if in an organization the shareholders are known to each other ,the temptation for t of 
them to collude could be irresistible. As a result, they would find the secret key of the 
company , which will be continued to be used. This attack does not weaken the security of 
our scheme in the sense that the number of users that have to collude in order to forge the 
signature is not smaller than the threshold value. However it is worth pointing out that t  or 
more users can conspire to compute the system secrets. 
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5. Illustration 
The following illustration support our scheme for practical implementation. We assume there are 
four users in the system. Out of four users  A , C ,  E  and  F any two users , say,  A and F  can 
generate the directed signature on a message m for the user B with secret and public key pair Bx   =  6 
, By   =  8 respectively. The following steps illustrate this scheme.   
3.3.1. Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation 
Let SDC choose   p =  23,  q = 11,  g  = 18 and  f (x)   =.  3  + 5x mod11, where f (0) = 3 is the 
group secret  key. The public values  ui   and corresponding secret shares vi   of users are as follow. 
                      Users                              public value (ui)                         secret share (vi)  
  A                                          9                                                4 
  C                                         12                                               8   
  E                                         14                                               7   
  F                                         16                                               6 
Now the SDC determines the group secret key as   f (0) and computes the group public key, Gy  , 
as Gy = 18 
3
 mod 23  =  13. 
3.3.2.Signature generation by any t users 
If any two users  A and F out of four users agree to sign a message m for user B, then the 
signature generation has the following steps. 
(a) The user  A randomly selects 
1a
K =  2 ,
2a
K
 =   7 and computes 1w = 3, 1z = 12. 
                        Similarly the user F randomly selects 
1fK = 5, 2fK =  9 and computes 4w = 4, 4z =  9.  
(b) Both the users A and  F make ( 1w , 4w ) and ( 1z , 4z ) publicly available through a 
broadcast channel. Once all( 1w , 4w ) and ( 1z , 4z ) are available, each user in H computes 
the product Z,W and R as 
                                    W  =  12,  Z  = 16  and R =   h (16 ,12 , m) mod 11 = 5 (let)                                                                        
              (c) The users A and  F compute their  modified shares as MSA  = 6 and  MSF   =  8.  
 (d) The user A  uses his/her modified share  MSA  =  6 and random integer 1aK  =    2  and 
calculates his/her  partial signature 1s  =  5. 
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(e) The user F uses his/her modified shadow, MSF   =  8  and random integer 1fK  =  5   and 
calculates his/her  the partial signature   2s   =      9. 
(f) Both the users A and F send their partial signature to DC who produces a group 
signature S  =  3. 
(g ) DC sends { 3, 12, 5, m} to B as signature of the group G for the message m. 
3.3.3. Signature verification by B 
              (a). B computes µ   =  [ 18 3.135.12 ]mod23   = 3and     Z
    
=16. 
              (b) B checks the validity of signature by computing R   =   5.                
3.3.4. Proof of validity by B to any third party C 
       (a)  B sends  {3, 12 ,5 , m, 3 } to  C, and C checks that R    =     5.                
                  If this does not hold C stops the process; otherwise goes to the  next steps.
 
     (b) Now B proves to C that  log 3 16   =   log 18 8 in a zero knowledge fashion  by using the 
following confirmation protocol. 
 (i).  C chooses at random u  = 11,v  = 13 and computes w   = 2 and sends w to B. 
                     (ii). B chooses at random  = 17 and computes   = 16 and    =  4 and sends ,   to C. 
              (iii). C sends u, v to B, by which B can verify that w   =  2. 
              (iv). B sends  to C, by which she can verify that    =  16 and    =   4                       
6. Remarks 
In this scheme, we have used the ElGamal public key cryptosystem to obtain the construction of 
threshold directed signature scheme. The security of this cryptosystem is based on the discrete log 
problem. Only t – 1 shadows are not sufficient to obtain the group secret key and they will also get no 
information about the group secret key, until t individuals act in collusion. 
In this scheme, there is a designated combiner DC  who collects the partial signature of the signer. 
We should note that there is no secret information associated with  the DC. Every user can compute 
his modified share under mod q. If q is not prime, then the calculations of the exponents is performed 
mod  (q), which is not a prime. This implies that Lagrange interpolation for calculating the modified 
shadows will not work (except when q = 3, in which case we are not interested). Consider the 
situation, when ∏
≠=
−
t
ijj
ji uu
,1
)(
 and q are coprime. In this case there is no way to find out the 
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multiplicative inverse of ∏
≠=
−
t
ijj
ji uu
,1
)( mod q. There is only  possibility of selecting the large prime 
q numbers in order for each person to get around this difficulty 
This signature schemes are meaningless to any third party because there is no way for him to 
prove its validity. The only knowledge of Z is not sufficient to prove the validity of signature. 
Signature receiver also has to perform the confirmation protocol in a zero knowledge fashion to prove 
the validity of signature. 
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